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Abstract
Effective migration management needs to be underpinned by a realistic understanding of the drivers and dynamics of migration and should 
incorporate lessons learnt about the effects and effectiveness of past migration policies. This study draws policy implications from the 
analysis of the evolution of European post-war migrations. It examines the effects of internal border opening combined with the ongoing 
convergence of immigration rules and visa requirements in Europe. Based on the insight that migration is driven by structural factors that 
often lie beyond the reach of migration policies, the second part of the study looks closely at structural factors that shape migration in both 
origin and destination countries and assesses the extent to which polices are able to address these factors. Two key areas are analysed in 
more detail: the level of development in countries of origin and the structure of labour demand in destination countries. The study shows the 
importance of understanding the impacts of ‘non-migration’ policies on long-term patterns and trends of migration. This is particularly 
relevant when the effects of economic, foreign, trade, development, agricultural or fisheries policies are potentially inconsistent with the 
political desire to control or curb migration.
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Executive summary 
Effective migration management needs to be underpinned by a realistic understanding of 
the drivers and dynamics of migration. It should also take into account the role of both 
migration and 'non-migration' policies in shaping migration flows. Post-war Europe has 
transformed from a region of net emigration to that of net immigration and there are 
lessons to be learnt about the effects and effectiveness of different types of policies in that 
period. Together with the analysis of trends and drivers of migration processes, these are 
essential insights for better anticipation vis-à-vis possible future changes in European 
migration patterns presented in the study.  
The study first explores the main phases of post-war Europe’s immigration history. 
As European countries underwent economic and demographic changes in the post-war 
period, the West and North European 'core’ that attracted large numbers of migrant 
workers expanded to incorporate also Southern European countries that were an important 
source of migrant labour in the 1950s and 1960s. Despite the economic slow-down and the 
discontinuation of European guest worker programmes in the early 1970s, non-European 
migrants continued to arrive, partly driven by family migration.  The economic restructuring 
and growing liberalisation of labour markets in the mid-1970s, 1980s and 1990s resulted in 
increased segmented labour demand for both lower skilled precarious workers and highly 
skilled workers, predominantly in the service sector. The historical overview indicates that 
demand for foreign labour has become a structural feature of European labour markets and 
has persisted despite economic recessions and rise in unemployment in many destination 
countries.  
Since the early 1990s, European regions have undergone important transitions. 
Southern European countries have firmly established themselves as destination countries 
whereas Central and Eastern Europe emerged as both a new source of migrant labour and to 
some extent also a destination for non-European migrants. The 2008 economic crisis 
demonstrated similar effect on non-European migration flows as the 1973 Oil Crisis. There 
has been some decline in immigration to Europe but the rate of returns has been lower than 
expected, particularly among non-European immigrants. The return ratio was higher for 
2 
 
intra-European migrants with free mobility rights.  This exemplifies that free-movement 
migration reacts more strongly to business cycles, whereas migrants who face more 
stringent immigration restrictions may prefer to ‘stay put’ despite decline in economic 
opportunities.  
Post-war migration regimes in Europe are partly characterized by internal border 
openings that increase mobility rights of EU citizens as well as convergence on immigration 
rules and visa regimes that aim at regulating and restricting access of non-EU nationals. 
Broadly speaking, the internal opening generate increased but lower-than-anticipated 
volumes of intra-EU migration across Europe while the alignment of EU states on visa and 
border controls does not coincide with a systematic decrease of immigration of non-EU 
citizens. These measures tend to reduce return, interrupt circulation and encourage 
permanent settlement and subsequent family migration.  
This study defies the idea that migration policies have been ineffective, as the vast 
majority of migrants continue to migrate within the law. There are nonetheless limits to 
what migration policies can achieve vis-à-vis other structural factors that influence migration 
processes. The difficulties in reconciling the demand for migrant labour with the wish to 
reduce inflows and to encourage migrant returns and circulation are one such example. One 
of the key messages of the study is that migration policies only have a limited effect on the 
structural factors that drive migration. Decision-makers therefore need to reach beyond 
migration policies in order to more effectively regulate migration processes.  
The second part of the study looks closely at structural factors that shape migration 
in both origin and destination countries and examine the extent to which polices are able to 
address these factors. Two areas are of particular importance here: the level of 
development in countries of origin and the structure of labour demand in destination 
countries.  
Firstly, and contrary to popular belief, most migrants do not move from the poorest 
areas and countries to the wealthiest regions. Rather, human and economic development 
initially expands human mobility and therefore has the tendency to increase emigration 
because it increases people’s capabilities and aspirations to migrate. This explains why 
middle-income rather than poorest countries tend to generate the highest numbers of 
emigrants. This implies that policies driven by the assumption that development in low-
income origin countries will stem migration flows are fundamentally misguided. They are 
more likely to increase rather than decrease emigration in the short to medium term. In 
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addition, careful assessment of the migration implications of the effects of trade 
agreements, agricultural and fisheries policies and development cooperation on 
employment and livelihood conditions needs to be incorporated into migration policies vis-
à-vis countries of origin.  
Secondly, labour demand in destination countries is a key migration determinant, as 
shown by the high correlation between migration and business cycles. Family migration, 
which constitutes a high proportion of immigration to Europe, should also be seen largely as 
an indirect consequence of labour migration. Even at times of growing unemployment, the 
highly segmented nature of European labour markets sustains demand for migrant labour, 
both in the low-status manual jobs that native workers tend to shun as well as in the 
medium- and high-skilled sectors where the domestic education systems are not generating 
enough qualified labour. To be more effective, migration policies therefore need to be 
coherent with economic and social policies. For example, the dominant trend of the last 
decades towards economic liberalization and the wish to boost economic growth seems 
incompatible with the political desire for less migration. Furthermore, ‘non-migration’ policy 
areas such as health care, child and elderly care and education also affect the structure of 
labour demand, including labour from abroad. If there is a mismatch between migration 
policies and socioeconomic policies, this is likely to sustain or even increase the demand for 
irregular and exploitable migrant labour. 
The last part of the study highlights several unintended effects of migration policies 
and documents them with empirical examples:  
1) Migration restrictions can divert migrants via other regular or irregular routes and 
destinations.  
2) Migration policies can reorient migration flows towards other regular or irregular 
channels by prompting migrants towards different legal categories (e.g. from a labour 
migrant towards a family migrant or an asylum-seeker). 
3) Migration policies can affect the timing and volume of migration (e.g.  ‘now or never’ 
migration).  
4) Migration restrictions can encourage permanent settlement by interrupting migrants’ 
circulatory movements and by discouraging their return for fear of not being able to come 
back.  
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Such unanticipated effects need to be better accounted for in future policymaking and its 
evaluation because they can reduce the long-term effectiveness of migration policies and, in 
certain cases, can make them counterproductive. These effects seem particularly strong if 
significant migrant communities have settled in destination countries and their social 
networks facilitate the continuation of migration. 
Overall, more research is needed to understand complex links between 
socioeconomic and labour market policies and migration patterns. Moreover, with the 
expansion of migration agendas into policy areas such as foreign and security policy, trade, 
development cooperation, agriculture or fisheries, there is an urgent need to examine the 
impacts of 'non-migration' policies on migration patterns and trends. 
Introduction 
Migration is a hotly debated yet surprisingly poorly understood phenomenon. This certainly 
applies to European migration, where the debate is often dominated by media images and 
accompanying political rhetoric that Europe is facing an unprecedented or even existential 
crisis as a consequence of the mass arrival of asylum seekers and unauthorized migrants on 
Europe’s southern shores. In this context, migration to Europe is often represented as the 
result of war, poverty, population growth and climate change in African and Middle Eastern 
origin countries. However, such ideas and the accompanying political and academic 
narratives are based on fear and myth rather than fact and empirical analysis. Popular and 
scientific ideas about migration are often based on out-dated push-pull models, which are 
misleading in terms of their analysis of the causes and nature of migration processes.  
This analysis will thus go beyond the analysis of migration policies alone, based on 
the insight that migration is driven by structural factors that often lie beyond the reach of 
migration policies, such as economic and labour market policies (for instance in shaping the 
structure of labour demand in European countries), welfare and social policies (for instance 
in affecting social security arrangements, which can indirectly influence migration 
motivations), as well as foreign, trade and aid policies, which can play an indirect, but 
significant role in affecting migration from and to non-EU countries.  
Migration is driven by structural factors that often lie beyond the reach of 
migration policies. 
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While states and citizens have a legitimate desire to regulate migration, such 
regulation can only be effective if it is based on a realistic understanding of the nature and 
drivers of migration. In order to achieve a more realistic understanding of migration, we 
need to rethink migration as an intrinsic part of larger processes of development and social 
transformation in origin and destination societies. This implies that migration is an inevitable 
complement of development and change, and that addressing problems associated to 
migration requires addressing those broader processes. Therefore, migration policies alone 
generally have limited effects on long-term migration processes unless they are 
accompanied by other policies, for instance macro-economic and labour market policies, 
which match their objectives.   
There is also a need to disaggregate rather abstract concepts such as ‘development’ 
to analyse how their different sub-dimensions – such as economic growth, political changes 
such as democratization, labour market segmentation, inequality, social security, education 
and technology – affect migration processes on their own account and in interaction with 
other migration determinants. This will be the focus of this paper. Such an analysis provides 
the necessary understanding to make an assessment of the ability of migration policies to 
regulate migration.   
The resulting improved understanding of recent migration trends and their drivers 
may also help us to develop future scenarios for migration within, from and towards Europe.  
From such understanding, we can gain theoretical and empirical insights into possible 
continuities and discontinuities of European migration for the future. To provide such 
insights, this paper analyses the dynamics and drivers of European migrations between 1950 
and 2015 and, on this basis, it will assess the past, current and future role of policies in 
affecting trends and patterns of migration.  Because of the limited scope of this study, the 
emphasis will be on a ‘big picture’ analysis of European migration trends and the 
identification of (migration and 'non-migration') policy areas that seem to matter most in 
terms of their influence on migration processes. This knowledge will hopefully improve the 
capacity of the EU and EU member states to anticipate and be prepared for future change 
and to design economic and social policies that are more likely to lead to desired migration 
outcomes.  
Changing contexts and the evolution of European migration  
Since the end of World War II, European migration has undergone fundamental changes. 
Unlike what many people think, global migration has not accelerated, with migrants 
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representing a remarkable stable 3 per cent of the world population over the past decades 
(Czaika and de Haas 2014). The main change has been directional in the form of a ‘global 
migration reversal’, in which the position of Europe on the global migration map has 
undergone a radical change. While for centuries Europeans have been moving outward 
through conquering, colonizing, and settling in lands elsewhere on the globe, while 
subjugating, killing or enslaving native populations, from a European perspective the 
dominant direction of world migration was partly reversed in the second half of the 
twentieth century.  
While they do often not see themselves as immigration societies immigration 
rates in many European countries now match or exceed those of the USA or 
other classical immigration countries. 
Under the influence of decolonization, demographic change, rapid economic growth 
and the creation of the European Union as a free trade and migration zone, Europe has 
emerged as a major global migration destination. While migration of Europeans to the 
Americas and Oceania rapidly declined in the 1960s and 1970s (Figure A1 in annex), Western 
European countries started to attract increasing number of migrants, mainly from former 
colonies and countries located on the European periphery. While they do generally not see 
themselves as immigration societies, immigration rates in many European countries now 
match or exceed those of the USA or other classical immigration countries. This had 
implications for global migration, as the drying up of Europe as a source of immigrants in the 
1950s and 1960s, increased the share of Latin Americans, Asians, and to some extent 
Africans, in migration to major immigration countries such as the United States, Canada, 
Argentina, Australia and New Zealand.  
Four phases of the post-war European migration transition 
There have been four main phases in the European migration transition (see (Castles, de 
Haas and Miller 2014), which are closely linked to different phases of economic 
development and concomitant changes in economic ideology, the changing structure of 
European labour demand, demographic changes and, last but not least, the twin processes 
of European integration and enlargement.  
1st phase: 1945 – 1970s 
In the first phase, the chief economic strategy of large-scale enterprises was to concentrate 
post-War investment and expansion of production in the existing highly developed countries 
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in Europe (Castles and Kosack 1973). Partly aided by the US Marshall programme, this 
resulted in high economic growth and increasing sectoral shortages of low skilled migrant 
labour, also because demographic change and increased education levels contributed to a 
decreasing domestic labour supply for such jobs (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014).    
As a result, large numbers of migrant workers were recruited from less developed 
countries in the Mediterranean region as well as from Ireland (to the UK) and Finland (to 
Sweden) into the industrial core of Western Europe which included (West-) Germany, 
northern Italy, Switzerland, Austria, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, the UK 
(England), Denmark and Sweden. In the post-War decades Mediterranean workers were 
mainly recruited from southern European countries including Portugal, Spain, Italy, former 
Yugoslavia and Greece. From the 1960s, as most of these countries entered their own 
migration transitions as a result of ageing and economic growth, German, Belgium, Dutch, 
French and Scandinavian employers started to increasingly recruit workers from Turkey, 
Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia as well as from particular former colonies, such as Senegal and 
Mali (to France) and the Caribbean (to the UK (cf. Peach 1968)). In other terms, with the 
gradually southward expansion of the ‘European core’, also the ‘labour frontier’ – the 
imaginary line separating emigration from immigration countries (cf. Skeldon 1997)-  shifted 
southward and further overseas.  
Gradual southward expansion of the ‘European core’ shifted the ‘labour 
frontier’ separating emigration from immigration countries southward and 
further overseas. 
The end of this phase was marked by the Oil Crisis of 1973, which led to a 
recruitment freeze but was also the onset of a series of economic recessions, which lasted 
far into the 1980s. Along with falling birth rates and rising labour costs in wealthy countries, 
this gave impetus to a restructuring of the world economy, involving capital investment in 
new industrial areas in developing countries, altered patterns of world trade, and 
introduction of new technologies (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014).  
2nd phase: mid-1970s – mid-1990s 
The second phase  coincided with an increasing prevalence of neoliberal economic policies 
dominated by economic deregulation, ‘flexibilization’ of labour markets (increasing the 
scope for temporary recruitment of migrant workers), suspension of state subsidies for 
sectors such as mining, shipyards and heavy industry, privatisation of state companies, less 
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progressive taxation and increasing economic inequality (Piketty 2014), as well as the 
austerity-driven partial erosion of social security arrangements.  
These political and economic changes contributed to the mass dismissal of factory 
and mine workers, including many former ‘guestworkers’ and other labour migrants. In this 
period, industrial production was partly relocated to low-wage countries. However, the 
recruitment freeze did not lead to the anticipated large-scale return of workers but, 
paradoxically, rather encouraged their permanent settlement, since the prospect of border 
closure and general uncertainty encouraged many migrant workers to stay on the safe side 
of the border and bring over their families (De Mas 1990; Entzinger 1985). Family reunion 
and new marriages between the ‘second generation’ and spouses living in origin 
communities are important factors in explaining why migration from the Maghreb, Turkey 
and other origin countries continued at relatively high levels even during period of 
recessions. However, mass unemployment and segregation contributed to the long-term 
marginalization of significant portions of these immigrant populations as well as the ‘second 
generation’.  
The growing bifurcation of labour market led to a resumption of the demand for 
lower skilled ‘precarious’ labour while the growth in specialized service jobs led 
to an increasing demand for highly skilled migrant workers. 
From the mid-1980s, economic growth resumed.  The rapid growth of the service 
sectors would draw in more and more low and high skilled migrant workers, while labour 
demand in sectors such as agriculture and construction was maintained. However, with the 
structural (and inevitable) economic shifts towards service-based economies, industrial 
labour demand did not recover, further contributing to the long-term unemployment of low 
skilled migrant workers  (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014).  The growing bifurcation of 
labour market led to a resumption of demand of lower skilled ‘precarious’ labour in 
agriculture and the formal and informal service sectors, including an increasing demand for 
female domestic workers and cleaners – partly because growing numbers of native women 
entered the skilled labour force. At the same time, the growth in specialized service jobs led 
to an increasing demand for highly skilled migrant workers. This gave a further impetus to 
further facilitate intra-EU labour mobility. Although the right to free labour migration was 
already established since 1968 (Goedings 2008), one of the central aims of the Maastricht 
treaty (1992), the concomitant establishment of the European Union and the notion of 
European citizenship as well as EU enlargements is to encourage free labour mobility, which 
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governments generally saw as beneficial for economic growth in destination and origin 
countries (Kindleberger 1965).  
3rd phase: mid-1990s - 2008 
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 heralded the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rest of 
the communist Warsaw Pact, the generally peaceful establishment of democratic 
governments in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the German reunification over the 
early 1990s. The immediate effect of the fall of the Berlin Wall was to precipitate temporary 
migrations of asylum seekers seeking refuge in Western Europe. This marked the beginning 
of a third phase of the post-WWII evolution of European migration systems, which lasted 
until the Global Economic Crisis of 2008. It was a period of further economic liberalization 
coupled with the inclusion of Central and Eastern Europe in the free European migration 
area (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014). 
Central and Eastern European countries emerged as important new source 
regions of migrants for Western and Southern Europe and some became transit 
and immigration countries in their own right. Europe’s southern and western 
peripheries firmly established themselves as destination countries. 
This phase thus saw the unanticipated opening up of a new ‘labour frontier’ in 
Central and Eastern Europe:  Poland, Ukraine, Albania, Romania and Bulgaria and the Baltic 
republics emerged as important new source regions of migrants for Western and Southern 
Europe (cf. Baganha and Fonseca 2004; Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2004a), but also became 
transit and immigration countries in their own right.  This period was also marked by 
renewed economic growth and the rise of new migration destinations on Europe’s southern 
and western peripheries, with particularly Ireland, Italy and Spain attracting many migrants 
from Eastern Europe, North and West Africa and Latin America.  This is an important change 
from the period until 1990, when non-EU migration to the EU was dominated by migration 
from Turkey and the Maghreb.  These developments coincided with further European 
integration, the establishment of the borderless Schengen zone and the concomitant 
reinforcement of border controls at the EU’s external borders. By the 1990s, particularly 
Spain and Italy had completed their migration transitions and had firmly established 
themselves as destination countries.  
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4th phase: 2008 - ongoing 
The global economic crisis (GEC) in 2008 seems to mark the – at least temporary – end of 
this period of rapid economic growth and EU enlargement, and a fourth phase of European 
migration characterized by a consolidation and stabilization of intra-EU migration and a 
higher-than-expected continuation of immigration of non-EU nationals. Initially, the GEC led 
to decreasing migration within and towards the EU. Nevertheless, and in parallel to the 
experience after the 1973 Oil Crisis, this decline in immigration has been relatively modest, 
and the anticipated mass return has not occurred. The tendency to stay put and not to 
return has been particularly high among migrants from non-EU countries such as Ecuador 
and Morocco, partly out of fear that they were not able to re-migrate (BBC/MPI 2010; 
Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014). For intra-European migrants, return ratios have generally 
been higher, highlighting the fact that the absence of migration barriers tends to stimulate 
return and circulation and suggesting that migration restrictions have the tendency to 
interrupt circulation and push migrants into permanent settlement.  
Figure 1. Migration to EU25 countries1  
 
Source: DEMIG C2C database, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, see de 
Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018 
 
                                                          
1 Excluding the UK, for which no origin-country specific data was available. 
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The largest effect of the crisis was on intra-EU migration and migration from non-
EU25 European countries, which initially slowed down, while several particularly crisis-hit 
countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland saw increasing emigration. This partly 
led to increasing South-North migration with increasing movement of Spaniards, 
Portuguese, Italians to northern Europe, although this primarily concerns circular migration.  
Between 2007 to 2012 migration to EU countries declined, which primarily reflected 
decreasing intra-EU migration (OECD 2011). This confirms that free-movement migration 
reacts rather directly to business cycles (cf. Czaika and Haas 2016). Yet also non-EU 
immigration declined, and in 2012 legal permanent migration from third countries to Europe 
was slightly lower than legal permanent migration to the United States (OECD 2014).   
The largest effect of the crisis was on intra-EU migration and migration from 
non-EU25 European countries, which initially slowed down, while several 
particularly crisis-hit countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland saw 
increasing emigration. 
Starting in 2012, and particularly since 2015, both intra-EU (East-West and also, to 
some extent, South-North) and extra-EU migration have rebounded, mainly as a 
consequence of resumed economic growth and falling unemployment in North-West 
Europe. According to Eurostat data, in 2015 total intra-EU migration was 1.4 million while 
total legal migration from non-EU countries was 2.4 million. While Romania and Poland are 
the most important origin countries for intra-EU migration, Ukraine and Syria have risen as 
main non-European origin countries for first residence permits issued in 2016. The fact that 
intra-EU migration and extra-EU immigration have not declined as much as expected and 
have rebounded to pre-crisis levels reflects the structural demand for migrant labour in the 
segmented labour markets of the EU, the fact that refugee and family migration are less 
affected by economic trends as well as the growing importance of humanitarian and student 
migration.  
The fact that intra-EU migration and extra-EU immigration have not declined as 
much as expected and have rebounded to pre-crisis levels reflects the structural 
demand for migrant labour in the segmented labour markets of the EU. 
From 2015, migration debates in Europe became increasingly dominated by the 
growing migration of Syrian and other refugees entering from Turkey and Greece into 
Europe as well continued ‘boat migration’ and smuggling from North Africa. Although it 
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seems a new phenomenon, trans-Mediterranean boat migration had already started in 1991 
and increased in significance over subsequent decades as a consequence of increasing 
immigration restrictions and border surveillance.  In 2015, almost 1.3 million asylum seekers 
came to Europe, with Syrians and Afghans representing about 25% and 16% of applications. 
Germany alone registered 440,000 formal asylum applications and more than one million 
pre-registrations (OECD 2016). Since the 2016 asylum applications have decreased 
coinciding with increasing border controls and the relative waning of the scale and levels of 
conflicts in origin countries. 
Policy implications 
The past seven decades of European migration history have yielded the following policy 
implications:  
(1) The demand for migrant workers is structurally embedded into liberalized European 
labour markets explaining the continuation of substantial labour immigration even 
in times of economic recessions;  
(2) Despite initial post-accession increases, free migration within an enlarged EU has 
remained lower than anticipated and has substituted migration from outside the EU 
only to a limited degree.  
(3) Free intra-EU mobility is more circulatory and reactive to business cycles compared 
to policy-constrained migration from outside the EU, which has a higher tendency to 
gain a permanent character through the postponement and cancellation of 
migrants’ return plans;  
(4) Family migration tends to gain in importance in times of economic recession, 
particularly as a consequence of non-EU labour migrants deciding to settle instead 
of return.  
The effects of internal opening of borders on population 
mobility in the European Union 
The fear of uncontrolled mass immigration as a result of open-border policies plays a major 
role in European migration policy debates.  The process of EU enlargement is an interesting 
‘quasi-natural experiment’ to study the short- and long-term consequences of open border 
regimes on population mobility.  
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The process of internal opening 
The European Union has gone through a process of internal opening since 1951 when 
Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands founded the European 
Coal and Steel Community, and in 1957, the European Economic Community (EEC) and the 
European Atomic Energy Community. In seven successive accession waves from 1973 to 
2013, the EU has expanded to its current 28 members (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 
2018).2  
Fears of mass immigration upon accession of new member countries have 
motivated the imposition of temporary immigration restrictions during transitional periods, 
whereby citizens of new member states did not instantly acquire full rights of residence and 
work in other member states (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018). In fact, it was not 
until 1968 when a council regulation was implemented establishing full rights for free 
movement within the European Community for citizens of its members (then Belgium, 
Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) as well as forbidding all forms of 
discrimination in the labour market. Worries about potential ‘massive flows from Italy to the 
other five founding countries’ of the European Economic Community (Goedings, 1998: 7) 
partly explain why it took many years to establish this free movement zone.  
This pattern would repeat itself during later enlargement rounds. After joining the 
EU in 1981, Greek citizens had to wait until 1988 to acquire full working rights and be 
protected against labour market discrimination in other member countries. Spain and 
Portugal joined in 1986 but restrictions in the access to the labour market applied until 
1991. On the other hand, Austria, Finland and Sweden were not confronted with any 
mobility or labour right restrictions when they joined the EU in 1995. The removal of 
restrictions for Cyprus and Malta in 2004 implied immediate access to the Union’s labour 
market. Yet for the other Eastern and Central European new member states of the 2004 
enlargement round, access to the labour market was granted straightaway only in the 
United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden. These new member countries had to wait until 2006 
to have full mobility rights for Greece, Finland, Iceland, Italy and Spain.  Workers from Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia received full rights in 2007 in 
                                                          
2 This enlargement process started with the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the UK in 1973.  
Greece joined the EEC in 1981 and was followed by Spain and Portugal in 1986. Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden became EU members in 1995, the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Malta, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in 2004, and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Finally, in 2013 
Croatia joined the EU. 
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Luxembourg and Netherlands, in 2008 in France, in 2009 in Denmark, and 2011 in Austria 
and Germany (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018). 
Upon joining the EU in 2007, citizens from Bulgaria and Romania gained immediate 
full work right for Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Sweden, but they had to wait until 2009 for free access to the labour markets 
of Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Portugal, Spain; until 2012 for Ireland, Italy and Norway, and 
until 2014 for Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain and 
the UK. The 2013 accession of Croatia follows the same pattern of a gradual removal of 
labour restrictions. The 2004 enlargement countries welcomed its citizens since the 
accession date, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands and Spain did so in 2015 and the UK should open its borders to them in 2018 
(de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018). 
In general, the data shows that fears of mass migration turned out to be largely 
unwarranted, as migration did stabilize after an initial post-opening increase. This pattern 
would repeat itself several times with the introduction of free labour migration following the 
EU enlargement process (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018). In some cases, such as 
with the accession of Spain, Portugal and Greece, there was no increase at all, as migration 
networks had already been established and economic and political conditions in origin 
countries were improving rapidly. The only exception in this pattern was when only a few EU 
countries granted full migration rights to new member states. In this case, migration from 
some of the new accession states tended to concentrate heavily on the countries with open 
border regimes, particularly when destination country economies were flourishing. This was 
highlighted by the post-2006 surge in Eastern and Central European migration to the UK. 
The data shows that fears of post-accession mass migration turned out to be 
largely unwarranted, as migration did stabilize after an initial post-opening 
increase. 
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Figure 2. Migration to EU15 countries from CEE countries, 1975-2009 
 
 
Source: DEMIG C2C, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, see de Haas, 
Vezzoli and Villares-Varela (2018) 
 
Drawing on data from the DEMIG C2C database on bilateral migration from and to 
European countries over the 1946-2011 period, a recent study (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-
Varela 2018) showed that the removal of migration barriers can lead to temporary migration 
surges, particularly when economic gaps between countries are large and origin countries 
have weak social security systems (Kureková 2013). However, in general, as figure 4 
illustrates for Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, post-border opening migration increases tend 
to be temporary, generally lasting a few years, after which levels of migration tends to 
consolidate at lower levels and become more circulatory (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-
Varela 2018).  Migration tends to consolidate at lower levels when potential migrants gain 
trust that borders will remain open, which may often lead them to postpone or cancel 
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migration plans. Under such open border circumstances, after an initial post-liberalization 
surge, migration tend to become increasingly circular, with migration levels closely 
correlating with economic opportunities in destination countries. This pattern has become 
typical for (free) migration within the European Union.  So, in the longer term, the impacts 
of border openings seem to have relatively limited effects on net immigration.  
However, on the national and local level the impact of post-liberalization migration 
surges can be significant. The unanticipated high level of Polish and other Eastern European 
migration to the UK (cf. Kubal 2012) is a particular case in point. A combination of high 
labour demand, the UK being one of the free countries immediately granting full labour 
rights and the existence of settled Polish communities explains this phenomenon. Although 
these migrations tend to be strongly circular, they turned out to be much higher than 
initially forecasted. The data also shows that emigration levels and post-accession increases 
have been relatively low or even absent for other accession countries such as Hungary, 
Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia. Although this may partly reflect under-registration 
and the absence of the UK from this data, this seems to partly corroborate Kurekova’s 
argument that levels of emigration have generally been lower in countries which retained 
relatively better levels of post-Communist social security (cf. Kurekova 2013, see further 
below). 
 These diverse experiences also show the pitfalls of taking ‘extreme’ cases such as 
Polish-UK migration as representative for the general post-accession experiences, which 
have been much more mixed. This also suggest that expectations that intra-EU mobility 
could form a substitute for non-EU immigration was based on rather naïve assumptions on 
the potential of intra-EU mobility and the institutional, cultural and language barriers that 
may explain why this migration did generally not reach the anticipated levels.  
Convergence of immigration rules and visa requirements 
Alongside the process of internal opening of labour mobility, the European Union member 
states have been converging on common rules with regards to visa requirements for non-EU 
citizens. This is particularly applicable for the common travel rules necessitated by the 
establishment of the Schengen zone. The 1985 signature of the Schengen Agreement would 
lead to a borderless European Area in 1995, which included all then EU members, except for 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, which opted out. Since then, all new EU members as well 
as non-EU members Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, Switzerland and joined the Schengen 
area.   
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Figure 3. Percentage of countries requiring visa to enter EU9 by continent of nationality of 
the travellers, 1973-2013 
 
Source: DEMIG C2C database, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, see de 
Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018 
 
Together with the gradual process of EU expansion, this contributed to a growing 
integration of European migration systems, a radical expansion of the European free 
migration space, and, to some extent, a diversification of immigrant populations.  This 
expansion is a continuous process, and includes non-EU members and (potential) accession 
states such as Albania, FYROM (Macedonia), Moldova, Montenegro, and in the future 
perhaps also countries such as Turkey, Tunisia and Morocco, for whom free access to the 
European mobility space is a key condition for fully collaborating with EU’s external border 
policies and particularly the outsourcing or ‘externalization’ of border controls.  
Development of common immigration rules, particularly the alignment of 
countries with regards to visa regimes has not stopped non-EU immigration and 
partly explains the decreasing return ratios to non-European origins. 
This process of the internal opening up of the European free mobility space 
alongside the creation of the Schengen zone coincides with the development of common 
immigration rules, particularly around the alignment of countries with regards to visa 
regimes. As figures A1, A2, A3 and A4 in the annex show, this has not stopped non-EU 
immigration, but may partly explain the decreasing return ratios to non-European origins, 
which is visible in these figures, particularly with regards to migration from Africa, Latin 
America and the Caribbean (de Haas, Vezzoli and Villares-Varela 2018). This seems to 
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corroborate micro-empirical evidence from survey data. For instance, the tendency to return 
amongst Senegalese migrants in Europe has decreased as border regimes and immigration 
regulations have become more restrictive over the past decades (cf. Flahaux 2014).  
Policy implications 
In sum, Europe’s experiences with the twin processes of internal opening and enlargement 
and external closure had yielded the following policy insights: 
(1) The lifting of immigration restrictions for citizens of substantially poorer countries is 
likely to lead to initial emigration hikes lasting a few years, after which migration 
levels consolidate at lower levels and migration becomes more circulatory.  
(2) If only some countries liberalize migration while other maintain temporary 
restrictions, this is likely to lead to a geographical concentration of migration to free-
entry countries, particularly if those offer significant economic opportunities (such 
as in the case of the UK). 
(3) The lifting of immigration restrictions will only have limited effects if migrant 
networks have already been established and origin countries provide economic 
opportunities. In fact, free migration may encourage migrants to return temporarily 
or permanently or to start circulating. 
(4) While the lifting of immigration restrictions greatly increases cross-border non-
migratory mobility for work, business and tourism as well as temporary and circular 
migration, the long-term effects on net migration seem more ambiguous as free 
border regimes tends to simultaneously increase immigration and return. 
(5) Visa regimes and other immigration restrictions tend to decrease return rates and 
increase the permanent character of non-EU immigration. This can undermine the 
effectiveness of immigration policies and exposes fundamental dilemmas for 
politicians who wish to simultaneously limit immigration and stimulate circulation 
and the return of migrants. These two wishes can be difficult to reconcile, 
particularly when significant migrant communities have settled in destination 
countries, in which case migrant networks tend to facilitate the continuation of 
migration.   
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Drivers of migration: theoretical considerations and policy 
implications  
This section will put the preceding overview of Europe in a broader perspective by seeking 
theoretical explanations for the observed trends and patterns. Such understanding of drivers 
of past European migration will also increase our ability to develop scenarios for future 
European migrations rooted in an in-depth analysis of the evolution of underlying migration 
drivers.  
Developmental drivers of migration 
While the question “why do people migrate?” seems easy to answer at first sight, the 
migration realities on the ground show the need for a more complex answer. On the one 
hand, it seems reasonable to assume that most people migrate hoping to find better 
conditions or opportunities, such as jobs, higher wages, safety, or freedom from violence or 
persecution. This is the implicit assumption underlying the ‘push-pull’ models, which see 
migration as the result of people making rational cost-benefit calculations. However, this 
type of basic explanations, while intuitively attractive, does not really help us to understand 
the complexity of real-world migration. For instance, why do most migrants not move 
between the poorest and wealthiest countries? Why do most migrants move from sparsely 
to densely populated areas? Why do many people never leave, or go back to, origin areas? 
Why do the wealthy and educated move more than the poor and the illiterate? And, last but 
not least, why do middle-income – and not the poorest –countries have the highest 
emigration rates? 
Most migrants do not move from the poorest to the wealthiest countries, and the 
poorest countries tend to have lower levels of emigration than middle-income 
and wealthier countries. 
Neoclassical migration theories assume that people migrate to maximise their 
income or wellbeing (Harris and Todaro 1970; Massey et al. 1998; Todaro 1969) and that 
migration is a (temporary) response to development ‘disequilibria’ between origin and 
destination countries, and will decline through a process of wage convergence. However, 
migration has been a constant factor in the history of humankind and is not a temporary by-
product of capitalist development. Furthermore, the wage convergence assumption ignores 
how power asymmetries often sustain economic inequalities. Both push-pull and 
neoclassical models fail to provide insight into the social, economic and political processes 
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that have generated the spatial wage and opportunity gaps to which migration is supposedly 
a response. It is therefore not surprising that the predictions of push-pull models and 
neoclassical theories are fundamentally at odds with what is seen in real life migration 
patterns. Indeed, most migrants do not move from the poorest to the wealthiest countries, 
and the poorest countries tend to have lower levels of emigration than middle-income and 
wealthier countries (de Haas 2010)(see figure 4). 
This is consistent with ‘migration transition theories’ that argue that human and 
economic development initially lead to a general expansion of human mobility and 
migration (Skeldon 1990; Skeldon 1997; Zelinsky 1971). Analyses of historical and 
contemporary data show that human and economic development is initially associated with 
increasing emigration (Clemens 2014; de Haas 2010; Hatton and Williamson 1998; Skeldon 
1997; Zelinsky 1971).  
Figure 4. The non-linear relation between development and migration  
 
Source: de Haas 2010 
 
In order to provide a more nuanced and realistic understanding of migration, it is 
useful to conceptualize migration as a function of people’s capabilities and aspirations to 
move within a given set of geographical opportunity structures (cf. Carling 2002; de Haas 
2003). This provides a better understanding of how macro-structural change affects trends 
and patterns of migration in complex and sometimes counterintuitive ways. Processes of 
human and economic development typically expand people’s access to material resources, 
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social networks and knowledge.3 At the same time, improvements in infrastructure and 
transportation, which usually accompany development, make travel less costly and risky.  
We can therefore say that development generally increases people’s capabilities to 
migrate over increasingly larger distances, but it does not necessarily lead to migration. 
Migration aspirations depend on people’s more general life aspirations, as well as their 
perceptions of life ‘here’ and ‘there’. Both are subjective and likely to change under the 
influence of development processes. Improved access to information, images and lifestyles 
conveyed through education and media tend to broaden people’s mental horizons, change 
their perceptions of the ‘good life’, and increase material aspirations. For instance, 
education often leads people to abandon agrarian lifestyles and make them aspire for a job 
in the service sector and a life in urban areas or abroad. For instance, a survey by 
International Labour Organization conducted in broad range of developing countries in the 
world showed that development and increasing education inevitably lead to people aspiring 
and searching for jobs in the urban sector within and outside their own countries (Elder et 
al. 2015) .  
The crux is that as long as aspirations in origin areas increase faster than the local 
opportunities, this will motivate people to migrate, primarily to towns and cities, but also to 
some extent abroad, particularly among the relatively better off (see de Haas 2014b). Once 
sizeable migrant communities have settled, social networks tend to reduce the costs and 
risks of migrating, with settled migrants frequently functioning as ‘bridgeheads’. Theories on 
migrant networks and the formation of migration systems have taught us that this can make 
migration partly self-perpetuating (Choldin 1973; MacDonald and Macdonald 1964; Massey 
et al. 1998). The emergence of migration systems inextricably linking origin and destination 
societies through reciprocal flows of people, money, goods and ideas therefore tend to give 
migration processes their own momentum (Bakewell, de Haas and Kubal 2011; Fawcett 
1989; Gurak and Caces 1992; Mabogunje 1970). If this coincides with migration-boosting 
development in origin societies countries, this can continue to facilitate migration over 
formally closed borders, often to the frustration of policy makers (Castles 2004).  Thus, as 
societies get wealthier, overall emigration aspirations are likely to decrease because more 
people can imagine a future within their own country, while immigration is likely to increase.  
The transformation of Italy and Spain from major emigration countries to prime European 
destination countries since the 1970s are powerful examples of such migration transitions.   
                                                          
3 Also known as material, social and human (or cultural) capital. 
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The emergence of migration systems that link origin and destination societies 
through reciprocal flows of people, money, goods and ideas tend to give 
migration processes their own momentum which can continue to facilitate 
migration even over formally closed borders. 
The concept of migration transitions should be distinguished from the theory of the 
migration hump. While transition theory focuses on long-term associations between 
development and migration, the idea of the migration hump primarily refers to short to 
medium-term hikes in emigration in the wake of trade reforms and other economic shocks, 
such as free trade agreements or the post-communist reforms in Central and Eastern Europe 
and Russia. Within the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
Martin (1993) and Martin and Taylor (1996) argued that adjustment to new economic 
market conditions is never instantaneous.  While the negative impacts of liberalisation 
(particularly on unemployment in previously protected sectors such as agriculture) are often 
immediate; the expansion of production even in sectors potentially favoured by trade 
reforms always takes time (Martin and Taylor, 1996: 52). So, we can expect more short-term 
migration even if the long-term effects of free trade would be beneficial. The same analyses 
can be applied to the (temporary or long-term) economic dislocations caused by post-
Communist reform (particularly in countries with weak social security systems) and the 
profound socioeconomic consequences of EU accession. This is an additional explanation of 
the largely temporary nature of post-accession emigration surges, which should therefore 
not be misinterpreted as a reverse migration transition on a structural level.   
When countries gain a high-income status, emigration aspirations tend to decline 
and societies start to attract more immigrants. In the resulting migration transition, 
countries then transform from countries of net emigration to countries of net immigration. 
This non-linear relation between development and levels of emigration explains why middle-
income (and even lower high income-) countries, such as Mexico, Morocco and the 
Philippines, tend to be the world’s most important emigration countries. For instance, the 
most important origin countries for EU-bound migration over the post-WWII era have 
typically been middle-income countries, initially on the western and southern fringes of 
Europe and, since the late 1960s, increasingly in North Africa, the Middle East and Eastern 
Europe (de Haas 2010). In comparison, migration from low-income countries such as in sub-
Saharan Africa and South and South-East Asia has been relatively low.  
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Conversely, going against popular perceptions of a ‘continent on the move’, the best 
available data show that sub-Saharan Africa, which includes some of the poorest countries 
in the world, is the least migratory region of the world (Flahaux and De Haas 2016). In a 
2014 study, Clemens (2014) has identified the average tipping point level at per capita 
incomes of USD 7,000-8,000 per year after which a country tends to transition from an 
emigration to an immigration country.  While the exact level of this tipping point is highly 
dependent on other migration determinants, available evidence clearly confirms the idea 
that development in poor societies will boost rather than decrease migration. Based on this 
model, further economic and human development in countries like Morocco, Turkey and 
Ukraine is likely to decrease emigration levels, while development in relatively stable and 
economically growing countries in sub-Saharan Africa such as Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria and 
Ethiopia (and perhaps also Egypt in North Africa) is likely to increase their emigration 
potential.  
Going against popular perceptions of a ‘continent on the move’, available data 
suggest that sub-Saharan Africa, which includes some of the poorest countries in 
the world, is the least migratory region of the world. 
This implies that such countries may increasingly replace Maghreb and Middle 
Eastern countries as sources of lower skilled labour for EU countries as well as Maghreb and 
Middle Eastern countries. This effect may be further exacerbated by increasing education 
and skill levels among populations of recent sources of non-EU labour.  Once incomes are 
above a certain absolute levels and families enjoy a certain level of social security, 
emigration propensities tend to go down. This may partly explain the lower-than-anticipated 
levels of intra-EU migration and the largely temporary nature of post-accession surges from 
CEE countries as well as the fact that EU enlargement and concomitant free mobility has not 
substituted migration of non-EU citizens to the EU. From a migration transition perspective, 
the emigration potential of accession countries is limited. This is becoming increasingly 
relevant in a context in which former accession countries such as Poland are becoming 
increasingly important migration destinations in their own right. This makes it likely that 
European core countries will continue to attract significant numbers of non-EU migrants in 
the short- to medium term, particularly under conditions of continued economic growth. 
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The emigration potential of accession countries is limited. Many are gradually 
becoming migration destinations in their own right. This makes it likely that 
European core countries will continue to attract significant numbers of non-EU 
migrants. 
According to migration transition theory, any form of development in the poorest 
countries of the world is likely to lead to accelerating (rural-to-urban) internal migration as 
well as emigration, which defies dominant analyses in policy and many academic circles. This 
suggests that we need explanations that do not confuse individual factors or motivations to 
move (which, indeed, often refer to better opportunities) with macro-structural 
explanations of migration processes, which contradict push-pull models. This shows the 
need to rethink migration as a constituent part of broader development and change, rather 
than as the sum of individual responses to given geographical opportunity gaps.  
Policy implications 
Empirical and theoretical insights into ‘migration transitions’ imply that the 'development 
instead of migration' policies may have unintended effects. EU migration policies have 
acquired an ‘external dimension’ that combine the outsourcing of migration controls to 
origin and transit countries with ‘prevention policies’ (Boswell 2003, de Haas 2007) which 
aim to decrease migration through the promotion of origin country development. Also EU 
development policies (EU-Africa, EU-ACP Partnership agreements (EPAs), Regional Economic 
Partnership Agreements (REPAs)) often contain implicit or explicit migration prevention 
components. However, the assumptions under such ‘development instead of migration’ 
policies are fundamentally flawed, because evidence strongly suggests that development in 
low-income countries increases people’s capabilities and aspirations to migrate and is 
therefore likely to lead an increase in emigration, at least in the medium term. Under 
unfavourable conditions, trade, aid and remittances can be complements to, rather than 
substitutes for, migration also in the longer term, even in middle-income countries, as the 
examples of continuing migration from Mexico, Morocco and the Philippines illustrate 
(Castles and Delgado Wise 2008; Martin and Taylor 1996).  
The structure of labour demand in destination countries 
While development in origin countries tends to initially increase aspiration and capabilities 
to migrate, the structure of labour demand in destination countries is another fundamental 
migration driver. In general, the high correlation between business cycles (periods of high 
and low economic growth) (see figure 5 for Germany) and immigration in Europe suggests 
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that labour demand is probably the most important migration determinant, all the more 
because family migration is often a consequence of labour migration. This does not mean 
that factors such as conflict in origin countries do not play a role, but refugees only 
represent a fraction (generally not higher than 10 per cent) of all international migrants. 
While development in origin countries tends to enable people to migrate, the availability of 
concrete economic opportunities in destination countries generally determine whether 
prospective migrants will actually move.  The implication for Europe is that patterns of 
future economic growth and labour market policies matter greatly in shaping future 
migration within, from and towards Europe. 
Destination country labour demand is the most important migration 
determinant; all the more because family migration is often an indirect 
consequence of labour migration. 
Figure 5. Germany’s GDP growth and net migration, 1970-20154 
 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (migration), World Development Indicators, World Bank 
(GDP growth) 
 
The segmentation of labour markets is a second key mechanism through which the 
growing structural complexity of labour markets drives migration, even in the absence of 
wage gaps and even in time of high unemployment. Dual (or segmented) labour market 
theory helps to understand how the demand for high- and low skilled immigrant labour is 
structurally embedded in modern economies and, particularly, to understand why migrants 
                                                          
4 The post-2014 divergence in trends is largely explained by increasing immigration of asylum seekers.   
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find reason to pick up apparently unattractive jobs that native workers often refuse to do, 
and are motivated to go through tireless efforts to obtain documents or to pay smugglers to 
cross borders illegally in order to obtain these jobs.   
Piore (1979), the pioneer of dual labour market theory, refuted the idea that 
immigration is caused by ‘push’ factors in origin societies (such as low wage or 
unemployment) or wage gaps, but by a chronic – and largely unavoidable – need for migrant 
workers in destination countries. He did not so much deny that wage gaps and 
unemployment may motivate individual migrants, but argued that such factors are 
insufficient conditions for migration to occur, because most people would not move in the 
absence of concrete job prospects. Piore argued that the built-in demand for migrant labour 
stems from the fundamental characteristics of modern industrialized economies:  
institutional obstacles to make low skilled jobs more attractive by increasing wages (also 
known as structural inflation); motivational problems preventing native workers to accept 
low-status, ‘dead-end’ jobs even if the pay is reasonable; decreasing domestic labour supply 
because of falling birth rates, increasing education and increased participation of women in 
the formal labour market (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014; Massey et al. 1993). Social 
status considerations help to explain why native workers often shun arduous, low-status 
manual jobs at the bottom of occupational hierarchies even in case of high unemployment 
and reasonable pay.  
The main reason why migrants are willing to do such jobs and do often not see them 
as degrading is because their primary social group of reference is their family and 
community of origin. As long as the primary social reference group remains the origin 
community, migrants are therefore less likely to be bothered by the low social status of jobs. 
However, with the passing of time, when migrants settle and family reunification occurs, 
origin community ties may wane and the prime reference group may shift to destination 
societies. Settled migrants as well as their offspring may therefore become less motivated to 
do such jobs, which can then create a demand for new groups of labour migrants.   
From this perspective the structure of labour demand in destination societies is a 
prime migration driver. International labour migration seems to be mainly caused by 
structural demand within advanced economies for both high- and low skilled manual 
workers to carry out production tasks (e.g. assembly line work or garment manufacture) and 
to staff service enterprises (catering, cleaning, care, etc.). Changes in the economic and 
labour market structure of receiving countries drive the demand for a varied set of labour 
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skills. While demands of manufacturing industries in Europe were met by immigration of 
manual workers until the early 1970s, the growing importance of the tertiary sector has 
triggered a demand for both high- and low skilled service sector workers over recent 
decades. This explains why migration to the European Union has continued despite earlier 
expectations to the contrary and despite often significant levels of unemployment in 
destination countries. 
Although many international corporations have partly or entirely moved production 
processes to low-wage countries, not all work processes, particularly in the service sectors 
and in construction, can be outsourced, mechanized or automatized (Castles, de Haas and 
Miller 2014).  Domestic work, catering and intensive horticulture are key examples. 
Domestic supply for low skilled labour has dramatically decreased because many women 
have entered the formal labour market and youngsters continue education for much longer, 
which explains why employers have increasingly relied on low skilled migrant labour. 
Together with neoliberal economic policies, this has contributed to the emergence of a 
growing gulf between the highly paid core workers in finance, management and research 
(primary market), and poorly paid workers, often migrants (secondary market), who service 
their needs (Piore 1979; Sassen 2001).   
Workers in the primary labour market are positively selected on the basis of human 
capital, but also often through membership of the majority ethnic group, male gender and, 
in the case of migrants, regular legal status. Conversely, those in the secondary labour 
market are disadvantaged by low levels of education (or a lack of recognition of their 
degrees and vocational training, as well as by gender, race, minority status and/or migrant 
legal status). The growth of the secondary sector has been reinforced through neoliberal 
reforms and the concomitant de-regularization of labour markets (Castles, de Haas and 
Miller 2014). Segmented labour market theory is also useful to understand how migration 
can continue even under circumstances of high unemployment and how the irregular status 
of migrants may actually serve employers’ interests, as it creates a vulnerable and usually 
docile workforce.  From this perspective, public racism, xenophobic discourses by politicians 
and restrictive immigration policies not only fulfil a symbolic function (such as to rally 
voters), but actually serve to facilitate and legitimize exploitation of migrants on the labour 
market by depriving them of their basic rights.  
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Migration can continue even under circumstances of high unemployment and 
the irregular status of migrants may actually serve employers’ interests, as it 
creates a vulnerable and usually docile workforce. 
From this perspective, rather than stopping migration, the primary effect of 
crackdowns on irregular migration and increased border and internal surveillance is to make 
undocumented workers more vulnerable to exploitation. For instance, in their study on the 
effects of internal surveillance on irregular migrants in northern Europe in relation to 
migrants’ counterstrategies to avoid detection and expulsion, Broeders and Engbersen 
(2007) found that the resulting cat and mouse game between the state and irregular 
migrants seems to result in a serious threat to migrants' room to manoeuvre and further 
increases their dependence on informal, and increasingly criminal, networks and 
institutions.  
Policy implications 
The increasing structural complexity of labour markets and increasing levels of educational 
and occupational specialization in Europe tend to boost migration and non-migratory 
mobility (the latter particularly through commuting). Depending on economic and labour 
market policies, the degree of bifurcation of labour markets between a formal and an 
informal sector increases the likelihood of substantial immigration or irregular worker to 
work in low-status and arduous ‘migrant jobs’ in the informal sector. In more regulated 
labour markets with strong government oversight (for instance on labour laws) and welfare 
provisions, irregular migration (particularly of care workers) is likely to be more limited.  
Labour market policies are therefore important indirect migration drivers since they 
affect the degree to which temporary recruitment of labour is possible, workers’ rights are 
protected, workplace abuses are prevented, and unauthorized labour is tolerated in 
practice. For instance, in the UK the level of labour inspections is much lower than in, for 
instance, Germany. Lax government oversight of such practices can lead to situations of 
irregular migration, overstaying or ‘semi-compliance’ (employment of migrants who are 
legally resident but working in violation of employment restrictions – (see Ruhs and 
Anderson 2010)) and semi-legality (Kubal 2013), which is very common, particularly in 
liberalized economic systems such as the UK (cf. Kubal 2012; Ruhs and Anderson 2010) or in 
countries with large informal sectors, such as in southern Europe (cf. Ambrosini 2001; 
Reyneri 2001).  
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There is a strong interconnection between migration and labour market policies. 
Ineffective implementation in one of the areas easily creates situations of ‘semi-
compliance’. 
For instance, a study on Polish and Albanian migrants in Italy found that immigration 
bureaucrats adopted inconsistent and highly personalized policy implementation, creating 
an informal social and institutional environment that on the one hand prevented migrants 
from regularizing their status, but on the other hand gave migrants the opportunity to 
improve their living and working conditions (Kosic and Triandafyllidou 2004b).  This 
highlights the strong interconnections between migration and labour market policies, in 
which ineffective implementation easily creates situations of ‘semi-compliance’ (Ruhs and 
Anderson 2010).   
The structure of labour demand and, hence, immigration is also affected by health 
care, childcare and elderly care policies.  This explains why even severely crisis-hit countries 
like Italy and Spain continue to experience relatively high levels of immigration of care 
workers. In destination countries, welfare regimes also interact with migration by raising 
different demands for foreign labour. For instance, decreasing availability of Italian domestic 
workers in Italy and a rather unsuccessful expansion of public social services provided by the 
state in the 1960s-1970s, increased demand for foreign domestic workers. Additional 
regulations that made foreign domestic labour highly flexible made foreign workers an 
attractive source of domestic services provisions (Sciortino 2004). The Italian case also 
shows the interconnectedness between welfare provisions for elderly care and migration, 
whereby the reliance on foreign labour, once established, allows the state not to reform its 
elderly care system (Van Hooren 2008).   
The increasing demand for care workers has been a major factor in explaining 
continued migration of regular and irregular (increasingly female) workers 
towards EU countries. The demand for such skills may further increase in the 
future. 
Care policies seem to be particularly relevant as indirect migration drivers, since jobs 
like nursing, childcare, elderly care, cleaning and other domestic jobs can often not, or only 
partially, be automatized. The increasing demand for care workers has been a major factor 
in explaining continued migration of regular and irregular (increasingly female) workers 
towards EU countries, and the demand for such skills may further increase in the future. 
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However, the level and structure of this labour market demand is likely to be affected by the 
level to which governments will provide subsidized provisions for child and elderly care. A 
low level or decrease in public funding is likely to increase demand for informal care 
workers, as this is already the case in southern Europe and the UK.   
Educational policies affect the future domestic supply of skills, and, indirectly 
potential future skill scarcity. Because of labour market segmentation, high specialization 
levels and institutional constraints, these cannot automatically be solved by rising wages. In 
such cases, skill shortages are likely to create a demand for foreign workers and concomitant 
employers’ lobbies to allow or tolerate their immigration. A good example is the migration 
of health care workers (Martineau, Decker and Bundred 2004). For instance, already since its 
early days of existence the British National Health Service recruited foreign nurses and 
doctors from the British Caribbean and Africa (cf. Eastwood et al. 2005). This dependence on 
foreign health care workers partly results from, and may also perpetuate (in an interesting 
parallel with domestic and personal care workers in the Italian example) inadequate supply 
of UK-trained health care workers.  
Other drivers of migration and their policy relevance 
Trade, agricultural and fisheries policies 
In order to assess the impacts of EU’s trade, agricultural and fisheries policies on 
employment of workers, artisans, peasants and fishers in origin countries, it is important to 
look beyond national averages such as ‘GDP growth’. Average levels of GDP conceal large 
differences across countries in terms of income inequality and do not take into 
consideration levels of employment in different economic sectors. Theoretically, income 
inequality has ambiguous effects on migration propensities. While it may increase migration 
aspirations amongst the lower income groups, lower incomes may deprive people from the 
capabilities to migrate, particularly across borders, in which case they become ‘involuntarily 
immobile’ (see also Carling 2002). By contrast, if inequality and average income levels 
increases simultaneously, this might boost development-driven emigration hikes.5  
For instance, cheap food imports resulting from free trade agreements may put 
peasants and small farmers out of business, parallel to the effects of NAFTA (cf. Otero 2011; 
                                                          
5 Theoretically, countries with high levels of income inequality should be relatively attractive for 
skilled migrants (as they can expect to earn higher incomes and pay lower taxes) while countries with 
more compressed wage structures should be more attractive for lower skilled migrants. However, this 
has never been proven empirically and depends on the interaction with other migration drivers. 
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Wise 2006).  This also suggests that the EU’s Common Agricultural Policies (CAPs), which 
subsidize European agricultural production and make it more difficult for non-EU farmers to 
compete in international markets,  have important indirect effect in undermining peasants’ 
livelihoods in origin countries. This may indirectly encourage them to migrate to cities or 
abroad to search for a better living.  
Agricultural Policies and fisheries agreements, which make it more difficult for 
non-EU peasants to compete in international markets and for small-scale fishers 
to make a living can motivate people to emigrate. 
Similar indirect, but potentially important, links exist between the fisheries 
agreements with third countries in North and West Africa and migration dynamics. For 
instance, in 1979 Senegal signed a fisheries agreement with the European Community which 
granted rights and established fees for EU vessels to fish in Senegalese waters. By the 1990s, 
a general overexploitation of fish stocks was observed (Binet, Failler and Thorpe 2012), 
which has at least partly been linked to overfishing by industrial trawlers linked to the 
European Union as well as to China and Russia (LaFraniere 2008). Although Senegal stopped 
signing fisheries agreements with the EU in 2006, in 2010-2012 the Senegalese government 
allegedly granted fishing licenses to European and Russian fishing vessels and in 2015, the 
EU and Senegal signed a Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement that allowed up to 38 
EU boats to fish in Senegalese waters for a payment of EUR8.69 million by the EU to Senegal. 
As earning a living from fishing has become increasingly difficult, artisan fishermen are 
resorting to take longer and more costly journey to faraway fishing grounds, while some of 
them have turned towards irregular migration, either as providers of transport or as 
migrants themselves (Binet, Failler and Thorpe 2012).  Curiously, as fishers migrated 
irregularly to the Canaries, the Senegalese government was granted European funds in an 
attempt at reintegrating young repatriated (deported) Senegalese migrants into local rural 
development programs (Binet, Failler and Thorpe 2012: 10). Although it would be misleading 
to attribute increasing emigration mainly to such factors, they seem to have further 
encouraged emigration in addition to other factors such as increasing education, 
infrastructure and urbanization. 
Welfare and social security 
As already illustrated on the case of migrant domestic workers, welfare provisions and social 
security provisions may affect migration in complex ways. On the destination country level, 
there is an extensive literature on the ‘welfare magnet’, the idea that countries with 
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generous welfare systems attract a higher number of, particularly lower skilled, migrants. 
There is no solid evidence to support this hypothesis (Giulietti 2014; Gordon and Handler 
1999; Kurekova 2013; Levine and Zimmerman 1999; UNDP 2009).  In comparison, there is a 
lack of studies that examine the potential role of welfare provision and social security in 
origin countries in retaining migrants. According to the New Economics of Labour Migration 
(NELM) theory (Stark 1991; Taylor 1999) which argues that migration in poor countries is 
part of risk-diversifying household strategies, such factors should have an emigration-
dampening effect (cf. Massey et al. 1993). The few studies that have examined this indeed 
seem to suggest that welfare provisions (such as income transfers, access to public health 
care and education) can indeed retain potential emigrants. The historical study by 
Khoudour-Casteras (2008) and more recent work by Kurekova (2013) (on migration from 
Central and Eastern European EU accession countries) and Mahendra (forthcoming) (on 
Indonesian and global migration data) seem to confirm this idea. Social security policies 
therefore have a considerable potential to affect migration indirectly.  
Studies that examined the role of welfare provision and social security in origin 
countries in retaining migrants suggest that welfare provisions (such as income 
transfers, access to public health care and education) can retain potential 
emigrants, particularly in the short term. 
Education 
Education is an important motivation for and a driver of migration (cf. Elder et al. 2015; Levy 
and Wadycki 1974; Schewel 2014). Rising levels of education typically go along with 
increasingly complex divisions of labour and the geographical expanse of labour markets. 
While this increases overall levels of migratory and non-migratory mobility in societies, the 
extent to which this increases internal and international migration depends on opportunities 
in region and countries of origin. Education also tends to increase people’s material and 
other life aspirations, which can be an additional explanation for the paradox of increasing 
emigration under conditions of rapid development, particularly if there is an increasing gap 
between education-driven rising aspirations and the availability of jobs that can match those 
aspirations. This is often the case of middle-income countries experiencing a ‘youth bulge’.  
Education tends to increase people’s material and other life aspirations, which 
can be an additional explanation for increasing emigration under conditions of 
rapid development. 
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Infrastructure and technological change 
Infrastructure development and technological change have theoretically ambiguous impacts 
on the movement of people. Although it is often assumed that technological progress 
increases migration, easier transportation and communication may enable people to 
commute or work from home, while outsourcing and trade may also partly reduce the need 
to migrate. In modern times, technological progress has certainly boosted non-migratory 
mobility – such as commuting, tourism and business travel – but its impact on residential 
migration is rather ambiguous. The idea that technology may also allow people to stay and 
that non-migratory mobility may partly take away the need for migrating was already raised 
by Zelinsky (1971) and may also be confirmed by decreasing levels of internal migration in 
countries such as Japan, the United States and the Netherlands (see figure 6) as well as 
comparatively low levels  of intra-EU migration. On the other hand, such declining internal 
migration tendencies may indicate the exhaustion of traditional rural domestic sources of 
low skilled labour, which may partly reinforce the (growing) demand for foreign labour. 
However, depending on policies and technological progress, labour shortages may also 
prompt further automation of production and services.  
Technological progress has certainly boosted non-migratory mobility but its 
impacts on residential migration are rather ambiguous as it may also partly 
reduce the need to migrate. 
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Figure 6: Internal migration rate (movement between municipalities), the Netherlands 
   
Data source: CBS Netherlands 
 
Political freedoms, conflict and violence 
Intuitively, political oppression, conflict and violence should lead to increased (refugee and 
other) emigration. However, from a theoretical point of view the effects are much more 
ambiguous. While it seems sensible to argue that authoritarianism, repression, violence and 
overall insecurity increase migration aspirations, the same factors may also deprive people 
from the capabilities of moving or make them prefer to stay in order to protect family and 
community members (de Haas 2010). Authoritarian states also seem to have a greater 
capacity to allow large-scale immigration of migrant workers while giving them few rights, 
because they can ignore human rights as well as popular demands for less immigration 
(Ruhs and Martin 2008; Ruhs 2013). This can explain the frequent absence of a strong 
statistical correlation between the level of political authoritarianism and emigration levels 
and a positive effect of authoritarianism on levels of immigration (cf. de Haas 2010). For 
instance, wealthy member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council tend to combine 
extremely high levels of immigration with high levels of authoritarianism.  On the other 
hand, despite, or as a result of, decades of political oppression, a country like Ethiopia had 
one of the lowest levels of international emigration amongst African countries.   
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High levels of authoritarianism do not necessarily lead to more emigration or 
lower immigration. Authoritarianism can increase migration aspirations but can 
at the same time decrease migration capabilities. Authoritarian states also seem 
to have a greater capacity to allow large-scale immigration of migrant workers 
while denying them various rights, because they can ignore human rights as well 
as popular demands for less immigration. 
It seems rather a combination of violent conflict and the absence or collapse of 
central state power that tends to lead to high levels of (refugee and other) emigration. This 
corroborates that foreign and military policies are key migration drivers, particularly with 
regards to future refugee migration. The EU and its member states have taken a rather 
pragmatic approach in collaborating with ‘strongmen’ and autocratic governments in the 
Middle East and Africa who routinely violate human rights of their citizens and foreigners on 
their territory. While such policies are often defended from the viewpoint that these 
governments provide stability, the long term consequences of such policies can be adverse 
as the long-term consequences of decades of mounting frustrations among new generations 
of disenfranchised, unemployed and politically excluded youth can lead to violent eruptions 
and, potentially, civil War, as the Arab Spring, and particularly, the case of Syria have 
recently illustrated (cf. Fargues 2017). For instance, it should be thought through what the 
long-term consequences may be of the de facto support by EU states to the military regime 
in Egypt. Also support by EU member states for military interventions in countries like Iraq 
and Afghanistan or in the battle against ISIS has contributed to displacement and refugee 
movements. The long-term humanitarian interest to prevent new conflict and displacement 
could be an incentive for the EU to increase its efforts to support equitable development, 
encourage democratic governance and actively prevent conflict in Africa and the Middle 
East.  
Demographic structure and population size 
Demographic factors are often assumed to have a large effect on migration but empirical 
evidence has struggled to find a direct link (de Haas 2010).  This is because the effect of 
demographic factors is largely indirect, and mediated by other economic and political 
factors.  We actually do not see the highest emigration propensities in the countries with the 
fastest population growth, but in countries where birth rates have been falling sharply, such 
as Maghreb countries and Turkey.  Young adults tend to have a high migration propensity, 
and middle-income countries that go through economic transitions often also go through 
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demographic transitions marked by rapidly falling birth rates. In such countries, past high 
fertility is translated in a ‘youth bulge’, a high proportion of relatively well-educated young 
adults, which often find their high aspirations frustrated by sluggish growth, high inequality 
and political oppression. This can further spark increasing emigration alongside 
development processes. However, this is not an automatic link, as whether people will 
migrate will eventually depend on local opportunities and opportunities abroad. Some 
countries with a large youth bulge (e.g., Gulf countries) see low emigration and some 
countries with ageing populations (e.g., many CEE countries) see high emigration. It is thus 
important not to fall into the trap of deterministic, Malthusian thinking.   
The effect of demographic factors is largely indirect, and mediated by other 
economic and political factors. The highest emigration propensities are not 
typical for the countries with the fastest population growth, but for those 
countries where birth rates have been falling sharply and which face a large 
‘youth bulge’. 
Large countries with lager population tend to contain more migration within their 
own borders. This creates the ‘statistical artefact’ that, if we control for other migration 
determinants, there is a negative correlation between population size and emigration and 
immigration rates (de Haas 2010). Countries with small population sizes are less likely to 
have urban agglomerations where particularly skilled workers tend to find employment. This 
increases the likelihood that what is essentially rural-urban migration involves border 
crossing. This partly explains that large countries like China, India or Nigeria have actually 
very low emigration compared to their total population: most migration is contained within 
borders. Small states such as Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Belgium are almost bound 
to have high levels of ‘migratory interaction’ with other countries. This is somehow 
analogous to economic growth in larger countries such as the US and Germany, which is 
primarily dependent on domestic demand while trade is a much more important factor for 
smaller countries. However, despite their large population sizes, countries like Germany and 
the United Kingdom have comparable levels of immigration and immigrant diversity to those 
of smaller countries such as the Netherlands and Belgium.  
The effects and effectiveness of migration policies  
While migration policies are obviously an important migration determinant, the 
effectiveness of such policies is highly contested: Are borders largely ‘beyond control’ (see 
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Bhagwati 2003) or are migration policies rather effective? How do migration regulations 
shape migrants’ strategies? To what extent are origin and destination states able to ‘steer’ 
migration, and what limits the power of governments and states to ‘manage’ migration? 
Under what circumstances are they successful, and under which circumstances do they miss 
their target, or are even counterproductive, for instance by encouraging irregular migration, 
smuggling, interrupting circulation and pushing migrants into permanent settlement? These 
are crucial questions to answer if governments wish to make migration policies more 
effective while protecting the human rights and safety of migrants and refugees.  
Until recently, surprisingly few studies actually tried to measure the effects of 
migration policies, partly as a result of the absence of adequate data on migration and 
policies. One of the few exceptions is Hatton (2009), who investigated the determinants of 
asylum migration and concluded that the decline of asylum applications over the 2000s in 
the industrialized countries of Europe, North America and Australasia was largely caused by 
the decline of violence and terror in origin countries, and that more restrictive policies 
account for only about a third of the decline in applications since 2001. In another study 
explaining increasing migration to the UK since the 1970s, Hatton (2005) found that besides 
improved economic performance of the UK relative to overseas destinations as well as 
immigration policies at home and abroad, rising economic inequality had an even larger 
effect on increasing immigration, which is consistent with the idea that ‘neoliberal’ 
economic policies increase the demand for migrant labour in segmented labour markets.  
Until recently, surprisingly few studies actually tried to measure the effects of 
migration policies, partly as a result of the absence of adequate data on 
migration and policies. 
This corroborates the importance of looking beyond migration policies if 
governments want to be more effective in influencing trends and patterns of migration. 
Recent studies have quantified migration policy effects using bilateral (country-to-country) 
migration data covering large ranges of countries and long time periods (Czaika and Haas 
2016; Mayda 2010; Ortega and Peri 2013). de Haas (2011) identified four ‘substitution 
effects’ which can limit the effectiveness of immigration and emigration restrictions: 1) 
spatial substitution through the diversion of migration via other legal or irregular routes or 
destinations; 2) categorical substitution through a reorientation towards other legal or illegal 
channels; 3) inter-temporal substitution affecting the timing of migration such as ‘now or 
never migration’ in the expectation or fear of future tightening of policies; and 4) reverse 
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flow substitution if immigration restrictions interrupt circulation by discouraging return 
migration and encouraging permanent settlement, making the effect of entry restrictions on 
net migration and the growth of migrant communities ambiguous (see de Haas 2011). 
Spatial substitution effects 
Spatial substitution effects may occur through the diversion of migration to countries with 
less restrictive regulations or towards new, often more dangerous migration routes. Several 
studies have indicated the existence of spatial substitution effects for asylum, family and 
irregular migration to Europe (Grütters 2003).  The experience of 25 years of failed attempts 
to stop trans-Mediterranean boat migration is a case in point (de Haas 2008).  Until 1991, 
Moroccans did not need a visa to enter southern European countries such as Spain and Italy. 
The introduction of visas under ‘Schengen’ pressure to establish common border policies 
was the onset of irregular boat migration. When Spanish coastguards started to patrol more 
intensively along the southern Spanish coast and the Spanish exclave cities of Ceuta and 
Melilla on North African soil, this led to a diversification of maritime crossing points and an 
unintended increase in the EU areas that must be monitored to 'combat' irregular migration. 
In reaction to intensified border patrolling in the Strait of Gibraltar, Maghrebi and sub-
Saharan migrants started to cross the sea from more eastern places on the Moroccan coast 
to mainland Spain; from the Tunisian coast to Italian islands such as Lampedusa; from Libya 
to Italy and Malta; from Algeria to Spain. After 1999, migrants in Morocco have increasingly 
moved southward to the Western Sahara in order to get to the Canary Islands. 
European pressure on North African states to patrol their own southern borders and 
‘crack down’ on irregular migration led to further diversification of overland migration 
routes through the Sahara as well as maritime crossing points (Barros et al. 2002; Boubakri 
2004; Bredeloup and Pliez 2005; Carling, Gallagher and Horwood 2015; Collyer 2016; 
Perkowski 2016; van Reekum 2016).  Increasing surveillance in the Strait of Gibraltar and 
elsewhere has led to professionalization of smuggling methods, with smugglers using larger 
and faster custom-made boats and zodiacs instead of fishing boats (Carling 2007). There has 
also been an increase in the number of minors and pregnant women attempting to cross, 
who are generally more difficult to expel (Barbulescu and Grugel 2016). The huge length of 
land and maritime borders make it virtually impossible to prevent people from crossing.  
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The introduction of visas under ‘Schengen’, more intense border patrols and 
increased European pressure on North African states to patrol their own 
southern borders together led to diversification of both overland migration 
routes and maritime crossing points. 
Categorical substitution effects 
Categorical substitution effects may occur due to a reorientation towards other legal or 
illegal channels when entry through one particular channel becomes more difficult. For 
instance, the lack of immigration channels for low skilled labour migrants has compelled 
migration through family, asylum or student migration channels by people who basically 
migrated to work (Harris 2002; Massey 2004). This has happened after European countries 
decreased opportunities for low skilled labour immigration from former 'guest-worker' 
countries (Castles 2004; Czaika and Hobolth 2014; van Liempt and Doomernik 2006; Van 
Liempt 2007). A similar categorical substitution happened when southern European 
countries introduced visas for Maghreb nationals, which heralded a shift from labour to 
family migration. Restrictions can also divert migration in irregular channels. In a study of 
migration to 29 European states in 2001-2011 period, Czaika and Hobolth (2014) found that 
while restrictive asylum policies do reduce the number of persons claiming protection, a ten 
per cent increase in asylum raises the number of (apprehended) irregular migrants by about 
three per cent. According to these estimates, a ten per cent increase in short-stay visa 
rejections led to a five per cent increase in irregular migration. 
The lack of immigration channels for low skilled labour migrants has compelled 
migration through family, asylum or student migration channels by people who 
basically migrated to work. 
Inter-temporal substitution effects 
Inter-temporal substitution or ‘now or never migration’ may occur if migration surges in the 
expectation of a future tightening of migration regulations. For instance, when the Federal 
Republic of Germany tried to discourage family reunification in the late 1970s, family 
migration to the Federal Republic increased, since many migrants feared that, eventually, 
family reunification might be forbidden completely (Entzinger 1985). There was a surge in 
West Indian migration to the UK before 1962, when restrictions were introduced with the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Act (Peach 1968). The long-term effect of such restrictions may 
thus be limited or even become counterproductive, if the long-term effect is outperformed 
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by the pre-measure surge in inflows.  For instance, the Netherlands government pushed for 
Surinamese independence in 1975 primarily because it was seen as a way to prevent 
migration. However, this prompted about 40 per cent of the Surinamese population to 
emigrate before visas were introduced in 1980 (van Amersfoort 2011; Vezzoli 2015).   
The ‘now or never migration’ may occur if migration surges in the expectation of 
a future tightening of migration regulations. The long-term effect of such 
restrictions may thus be limited if it is outperformed by the pre-measure surge in 
inflows. 
Not only impending migration restrictions, but also migration liberalizations can 
generate temporary migration surges, which may be partly driven by a ‘now or never’ 
mentality caused by uncertainty whether the measure is only temporary. We have already 
mentioned the post-Berlin Wall and post-EU accession migration surges. Another example is 
the implementation by Ecuador of universal visa freedom in 20 June 2008, which was 
partially reversed on 1 December 2008 and 3 September 2010 in partial reaction to the 28-
30% on average increase of immigration from newly visa-exempted countries, particularly 
from China (Acosta Arcarazo and Freier 2015; Freier 2013). As the EU enlargement 
experiences shows, such increases tend to be temporary, particularly when potential 
migrants gain trust that borders will remain open, stilling ‘beat the ban’  panic reactions.  
Reverse flow substitution effects  
Reverse flow substitution effects occur if immigration restrictions decrease return migration, 
interrupt circulation and push migrants into permanent settlement. This is probably the 
most important but often ignored downside of immigration restrictions. This phenomenon 
has been described for Turkish and Moroccan ‘guest worker’ migration to north-west 
Europe, where many temporary workers ended up settling after the post 1973 recruitment 
ban (Castles, de Haas and Miller 2014; Entzinger 1985). It can also explain why immigration 
restrictions imposed by southern European countries for non-EU citizens in the 1990s and 
2000s interrupted circulation and accelerated the permanent settlement and rapid growth 
of immigrant communities consisting of workers and their families from countries such as 
Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal and Ecuador. For instance, before 1991 many Moroccans 
travelled back and forth to Spain to work as seasonal and temporary workers. The 
introduction of visa requirements in 1991 set in motion the phenomenon of illegal boat 
migration, and triggered permanent settlement of Moroccan labourers in Spain, which 
subsequently triggered large-scale family migration, and the rapid growth of the 
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Moroccan migrant population to over 700,000 in the 2000s (Cohen and Berriane 2011; 
de Haas 2014; Huntoon 1998). 
Immigration restrictions tend to simultaneously decrease immigration and 
return migration, interrupt circulation and push migrants into permanent 
settlement. 
If migration restrictions decrease inflows but simultaneously also decrease return 
flows, their effect on net inflows becomes ambiguous. This was confirmed by a recent 
formal quantitative test of reverse substitution effects6 (Czaika and de Haas 2014), which 
found robust evidence that visas simultaneously decrease immigration and emigration from 
and to particular origin countries. It also found that, on average, the immigration-reducing 
effect of visa restrictions was largely or entirely counterbalanced by their emigration 
(return) reducing effect. The study also found that while liberalizing measures often have 
immediate effects, the effects of restrictions may be smaller and tend to take more time to 
materialize. Therefore, migration policy change in a liberal direction does not have the 
reverse (‘mirror’) effects of a policy change in the opposite, more restrictive, direction. After 
the introduction of visa requirements, levels of immigration decline only gradually, and even 
after a decade immigration and emigration are still at significantly higher levels compared to 
the long-term average levels of migration in visa-required migration corridors (Czaika and de 
Haas 2014). The strong migration-facilitating function of migrant networks (Beine, Docquier 
and Özden 2011; Fawcett 1989) largely explains these lagged, partial and sometimes wholly 
counterproductive effects of entry restrictions.  
Studies show that decrease in immigration from particular origin countries 
following the introduction of visa can be counterbalanced by reduction in return 
rates to those same countries. 
Conversely, migration movements seem to respond almost immediately to the 
removal of visas, with levels of immigration and emigration reaching the long-term average 
levels of visa-free corridors after one to three years, after which they temporarily 
‘overshoot’ these levels for a number of years (Czaika and de Haas 2014). This may indicate 
                                                          
6 This study was part of the ERC-funded DEMIG (Determinants of International Migration) project, 
which drew on an unprecedented dataset containing longitudinal bilateral (country-to-country) 
migration data reported by 38 (predominantly OECD) countries on immigration and emigration from 
and to about 190 origin countries between 1973 and 2011 (covering over 90,000 bilateral dyad-
years). 
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the existence of temporal substitution effects upon visa removal, with some people 
engaging in ‘now or never’ migration out of fear of a reintroduction migration restrictions 
(see also Acosta Arcarazo and Freier 2015), but also because people who had aspired to 
migrate for years but were blocked in situations of ‘involuntary immobility’ (cf. Carling 2002) 
will now seize this opportunity.  
Policy implications 
Scientific evidence shows the following migration policy paradox: While migration barriers 
can create an obsession with migrating amongst young people who feel deprived of their 
mobility rights, attitudes towards migration in countries or territories with open access to 
Europe, tend to be more relaxed, emigration tends to be at lower levels and more circular.  
While internal liberalization of mobility has increased intra-EU circular migration, ‘external 
closure’ through the imposition of visa regimes for non-EU citizens and accompanying 
measures such as carrier sanction and intensified border surveillance has interrupted 
circulation by pushing non-EU migrants into permanent settlement (see also Castles, de 
Haas and Miller 2014).  This resonates with the study on Caribbean migration by Vezzoli 
(2015), who found that emigration rates have not only been high but have grown 
exponentially in countries who lost free migration rights because of independence from 
their European colonizers. At the same time, migration is decelerating in countries which 
have never gained independence, such as French Guiana and the Dutch and French Antilles 
(see Flahaux and Vezzoli 2017 Forthcoming).  
Mobility partnerships and other migration deals with third countries should be 
preceded by an analysis of potential trade-offs and should carefully assess 
potential unintended migration effects. 
The frequent occurrence of substitution effects highlights that collaboration in 
migration and asylum policies between the EU and non-EU states, such as through mobility 
partnerships (e.g. Morocco, Mauritania) or other ‘migration deals’ (such as the one with 
Turkey) can potentially affect migration trends, but their implementation should be 
preceded by a careful analysis of the trade-offs involved. These can generate unintended 
migration (‘substitution’) effects such as encourage smuggling, irregular migration, divert 
migration routes, push migrants into permanent settlement or prevent their return. There 
can also be potential backlash and long-term reputational effects when migrants and 
refugees are used as a negotiation chip with autocratic regimes. A particular case in point 
are the migration deals concluded with Gaddafi’s Libya and his subsequent involvement in 
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the ‘fight against irregular’ migration that emboldened his position and caused increased 
suffering amongst migrants and refugees (see Paoletti 2010).  
Conclusions and key messages 
Governments should look beyond migration policies if they want to increase their ability 
to effectively regulate migration. The structure of labour demand is a key migration driver. 
This study highlighted that the future of European migration primarily depends on factors 
that, at first sight, may seem to have not much to do with migration. This also means that 
governments should look beyond migration policies if they want to increase their ability to 
effectively regulate migration. Structural changes in European societies such as economic 
growth, population ageing, increasing education, increasing formal workforce participation 
of women, increasing specialization and the segmentation of labour market, explain why 
Europe has transformed from an emigration to an immigration region. Labour market forces, 
in particular, explain the continuous demand for EU and non-EU migrant labour and also 
explain why politicians often respond to pressure by employers to facilitate legal 
immigration. Although this demand fluctuates with business cycles, it is important to 
emphasize that the demand for migrant labour is structural. This means that this demand 
can be primarily influenced through economic, social and labour market policies, as these 
affect the future structure of labour demand.  
Development in origin countries will initially increase people’s capabilities and aspirations 
to migrate. 
As for the origin country causes of migration, there is increasing evidence that development 
through increasing income, education, media and infrastructure in low-income countries is 
initially likely to increase people’s capabilities and aspirations to migrate. Economic and 
human development in middle-income countries may decrease emigration tendencies, and 
such transformations may already be underway in Turkey and countries such as Morocco 
and Tunisia. Main origin countries may well change, particularly if important origin countries 
in the Maghreb and Turkey become destination countries in their own right.  This may cause 
a further south- and eastward shift of the European ‘labour frontier’, possibly causing 
increasing labour and family migration from countries such as Egypt and West African 
countries. However, the extent to which this will happen primarily depends on future 
economic growth and labour market dynamics in European destination countries. It also 
depends on the potentially destabilizing effects of EU’s external trade and foreign policies, 
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for instance on the viability of the agricultural sectors and peasant livelihoods in non-EU 
countries. So, while immigration is likely to continue as long as some level of growth in the 
EU persists, the real question is therefore where future migrants will come from and go to. 
This will ultimately depend on political stability, economic policy and concomitant structural 
shifts in labour market dynamics in both origin and destination countries.   
Migration policies overall are quite effective but there are limits to what they can achieve. 
Does the evidence show that migration policies fail and borders are beyond control? The 
answer is no. In Europe, the political media attention for Mediterranean ‘boat migration’ 
and irregular border crossings easily create a distorted and misleading image that irregular 
migration is now the rule rather than the exception. This contributes to an image of a 
general migration policy failure. In fact, most policies are quite effective. After all, the large 
majority of migrants move within the law and irregular migration is a relatively limited 
phenomenon. The best available evidence suggest that less than one out of ten migrants in 
Europe has no residency status (cf. Düvell 2009), although this proportion varies across 
countries.  
The evidence rather shows that there are clear limits to what policies can achieve. 
Immigration is neither a flow that can be turned on and off like a tap nor are admission 
policies generally designed to do so. After all, modern immigration policies aim to influence 
the selection and timing of migration rather than volumes of migration (Bjerre et al. 2014; de 
Haas, Natter and Vezzoli 2016). Through the implementation of sophisticated admission 
criteria with regards to employment and income immigration levels to most European 
countries tend to strongly correlate with business cycles. After all, in times of strong 
economic growth more migrants are likely to find jobs and thus obtain work permits.  This 
shows the built-in economic logic of selective immigration policies. Much migration is 
directly and indirectly (much of family migration is a ‘derivative’ of the movement of 
workers) driven by labour demand. Contrary to popular beliefs, migration is not an 
uncontrolled phenomenon mainly driven by forces of poverty and violence in origin 
countries.  
Migration policies need to be coherent with economic, social and other policies to avoid 
unintended consequences. 
However, if the aims of migration policies are incoherent with (or juxtaposed to) the 
migration implications of economic, social and other policies, migration policies are unlikely 
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to be very effective, or may actually have unintended, often counterproductive effects. For 
example, immigration restrictions and border patrolling can lock temporary labour migrants 
up on the European side of the border, discourage their return and stimulate their 
permanent settlement. The 25 years of European efforts to seal off its Mediterranean 
border ever since Spain and Italy introduced visas for North Africans around 1991 serve as 
an illustration of this dynamic. It encouraged irregular migration (primarily of prospective 
workers, but recently also of asylum seekers), created a market for smuggling and increased 
death toll. This has led to a diversification of terrestrial and maritime crossing points and an 
expansion of the ‘area to patrol’ by border control agencies, which now spans the entire 
Mediterranean, parts of the Western Atlantic coasts and the Sahara Desert (Collyer 2008; 
Crawley et al. 2016; de Haas 2007; Hamood 2006).  This shows that, to a significant extent, 
the root causes of such migrations lie beyond the reach of migration policies, and this 
highlights the need to root our understanding of such migrations in deeper transformations 
taking place in Europe and origin countries.  
Settled migrant communities create self-perpetuating network effects and limit the power 
of migration policies in steering future migration flows.  
Policies that ignore migration realities on the ground may fulfil an important symbolic and 
electoral function, but tend to be ineffective, particularly in the longer term. The evidence 
also suggests that governments and politicians should be careful not to re-create ‘guest-
worker’ illusions if they want to attract temporary workers: once a certain number of 
migrants have settled at the destination and viable communities have formed, restrictions 
are unlikely to stop migration, and may actually accelerate migration and permanent 
settlement.  So, governments have the biggest influence on migration at the start of the 
migration process. The more settled migrant communities are the more self-perpetuating 
network effects kick in and governments loose effective power in ‘steering’ migration. 
Particularly on the short- to medium run, the net effect of restrictions seems to be that 
more migrants decide to stay on the safe side of the border and to regroup their families, 
leading to accelerated growth of immigrant communities, which is often the opposite of 
what policies are meant to achieve. This migration policy paradox creates significant 
dilemmas for migration policy makers. 
More open migration systems tend to produce circulatory movements. 
The biggest influence of policies seems to be in whether to open a legal migration channel or 
not. Once it is open, and migration systems and migrant networks have been established, it 
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is very difficult to stop people moving through established migration corridors, and 
migration restrictions, if introduced without careful consideration of their effects, may turn 
out to be counterproductive. The evidence does also not suggest that that governments 
cannot and should not control migration, but it rather shows that liberal immigration 
regimes do not necessarily lead to mass migration and that ill-conceived migration 
policies can be counter-productive. Free migration is often strongly circulatory, as we 
see with intra-EU migration. The more restrictive entry policies are the more migrants 
want to stay. Such unintended effects create fundamental dilemmas for policy makers, 
which have to balance the wish to control migration with the wish to prevent 
substitution effects taking over and potentially weakening their ability to monitor and 
influence population movements.  
More research is needed into the effects of 'non-migration' policies on migration, 
especially to better understand the links between trade agreements, socioeconomic and 
labour market policies and migration patterns. 
This analysis also exposes the biggest gap in empirical knowledge: While the bulk of 
migration research has focused on analysing migration trends and the effects of migration 
policies, there is hardly any empirical work that explores the ways in which 'non-migration' 
policies such as macro-economic, social security, labour market, care, education, trade and 
foreign policies affect migration indirectly. Such research is urgently needed, in order to 
improve our understanding of what seems one of the biggest paradoxes of liberalization: 
The political desire for less migration seems incompatible with the trend towards economic 
liberalization and desire to maximize economic growth. The erosion of labour rights, the rise 
of flexible work and the privatization of formerly state-owned companies in recent decades 
have significantly increased the demand for migrant labour in Europe. The heated migration 
debates in Britain and the U.S. – both strongly liberalized market economies facing 
persistently high levels of immigration – seem powerful illustrations of this 'liberalization 
paradox'. 
From this perspective, the most effective way to regulate labour immigration seems 
to affect labour demand, through economic and trade policies and through enforcement of 
labour law to prevent irregular work. However, more research is needed to better 
understand the links between socioeconomic and labour market policies and migration 
patterns. Likewise, there is an urgent need for better research on the effects of trade 
agreements of the EU with third countries on peasants’ livelihoods and the knock-on effects 
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this may have on their migration. This highlights the importance of looking beyond migration 
policies. For instance, as the analyses of post-accession migration has shown, emigration 
patterns differ widely across the CEE countries, and the explanation of this should be partly 
sought into differences in wealth, political systems and social security in those countries. 
Likewise, levels and patterns of immigration differ across Western European countries, and 
explanations for this have to be sought beyond the domain of migration policies per se. 
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Annex 
 
Figure A1. North American migration to and from EU12 
 
Source: DEMIG C2C database, see de Haas, Hein, Simona Vezzoli,  
and Maria Villares-Varela 2018 
 
 
Figure A2. Asian migration to and from EU12  
 
Source: DEMIG C2C database, see de Haas, Hein, Simona Vezzoli,  
and Maria Villares-Varela 2018 
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Figure A3. African migration to and from EU12 
 
Source: DEMIG C2C database, see de Haas, Hein, Simona Vezzoli,  
and Maria Villares-Varela 2018 
 
 
Figure A4. Latin American-Caribbean migration to and from EU12 
 
Source: DEMIG C2C database, see de Haas, Hein, Simona Vezzoli, 
and Maria Villares-Varela 2018
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